Governmental participation and alliances of liberal parties in Europe [1]

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Chapter 16

Introduction

As this chapter shows in detail, in most European democracies Liberal parties are not only represented in parliament but have also been in office at some point in time. In fact, Liberal parties have been unusually successful at getting into government and have been in power to an extent that far exceeds their electoral or parliamentary strength (Kirchner, 1988). More specifically, in most European countries, Liberal parties have been in the majority of governments despite typically having a parliamentary seat share of between 5 and 15%. This ability to successfully transform a relatively modest electoral standing to government participation, also means that Liberal parties have been unusually successful in obtaining ministerial portfolios. Government participation comes with the responsibility for ministries, and Liberal parties have often held major portfolios and had opportunities to influence salient policy areas, in particular Finance and Foreign Affairs. Accordingly, in this chapter we investigate the government participation and alliances of Liberal parties and specifically try to provide answers for the following questions: How often have Liberal parties participated in national government and with which preferred partners? Under which circumstances do Liberal parties get into government? And when getting into office, which ministerial portfolios do they usually obtain? A central question is whether this relative success of Liberal parties in ensuring political influence stems from particular skills at playing the political game or whether there are more general reasons behind it. Liberal parties are, for example, often centrally located on the ideological spectrum, and this opens up interesting potential collaborations both to the right and to the left (Laver and Schofield, 1990). Moreover, Liberal parties have been active for a long time in most party systems and have therefore had ample time to develop sound relations with other parties in the system. Their long history and experience of government also make them safe(r) choices because other parties (and voters) know what to expect from them (Grotz and Weber, 2012). Thus, in this chapter we use theoretical and empirical insights from other comparative studies in coalition politics to offer some potential explanations as to why Liberal parties have been disproportionately successful at ensuring formal representation in the European



Figure 16.1: Liberal parties in governments

democratic machinery. The chapter is organized as follows. We start by providing a comparative examination of the patterns of government participation, or lack thereof, of Liberal parties in 28 European democracies from 1945-2015. We then proceed to look at the control of ministries, and thus potential policy impact. For this purpose, we use a new and updated dataset on ministerial portfolio allocation to be able to investigate which kind of portfolios Liberal parties tend to get and how frequently they have obtained portfolios in the European countries under study. The chapter closes by summarizing the findings and discussing what might lie ahead for Europe's Liberal parties.

Liberal parties in government

Although, Liberal parties have on average been successful in getting into power, a closer look at the empirical record shows that they have been better able to get into government in some countries than in others. Figure 16.1 identifies the cases of Liberal parties in government, with several parties spending more than one subsequent spell in government. In some countries, Liberal parties have never been in government (i.e. Greece and Spain) or only rarely been part of the government (i.e. Austria, Czech Republic, Latvia and UK). In other countries, they have been more successful, for instance in Denmark, Finland, Germany and in Switzerland where they have been included in a vast majority of the cabinet existed.

Why are Liberal parties often so successful in getting into government, even

though many of them are not particularly electorally successful? To answer this question, previous theoretical and empirical work that focuses on government participation or "who gets in" is of particular importance (Franklin and Mackie, 1984, Warwick, 1996, Mattila and Raunio, 2004, Döring and Hellström, 2013). In this literature a set of factors at both the party and the party system/country levels has been singled out as important determinants of a party's chance of entering government. One of the most important factors in this respect is electoral performance or, more precisely, the number of seats held by a party in parliament (Döring and Hellström, 2013, Mattila and Raunio, 2004). Particularly, obtaining majority control in parliament almost guarantees government participation, but at the same time also strongly reduces the incentives to invite coalition partners. For Liberal parties this is an exception, as only a few of them have ever become the majority winner (i.e. Bulgarian NDSV in the 2001 elections, the Irish Fianna Fáil in late 1950s to 1970 and the Portuguese PSD in the 1987 and 1991 elections). Generally, Liberal parties have instead predominantly been included in coalition governments. However, even in minority situations, parties' chances of getting into a coalition government or gaining the opportunity to form a minority single-party government depend on their success in the elections. In most countries, the party that gained the highest number of seats (or the largest party) in parliament is given the first chance to form a government. It becomes the *formateur* in the process of coalition formation (Warwick, 1996, Bäck and Dumont, 2008). Thus, the largest party is likely to become a government member, but is also likely to get the Prime Ministership. Table 16.1 shows the share of number of cabinets (both single-party and coalition cabinets) that Liberal parties participated in, as well as the share of Prime Ministers, their average seat share (in general and when in office), and how frequently they are the median legislator, or in other words, the median legislative party (i.e. the party with the median position that divides the legislature into two halves). The table also shows how often Liberal parties are ideologically adjacent to the median legislator.

When looking at the Liberal parties from the 27 European countries examined in this study, we find that being the largest party does increase the likelihood of becoming a government member. Of all parliamentary elections between 1945-2015, Liberal parties were the largest party in about 10 per cent of the elections and became cabinet members in about 85 percent of those cases.

Table 16.1 also indicates that Liberal parties do a lot better in getting into government than they do in the parliamentary elections. Comparing seat share and share of cabinets, the table shows that Liberal parties have been particularly successful in Switzerland (FDP), where they have been included in every single government. In Slovenia (mostly LDS), Finland, Estonia, the Netherlands, Denmark, Croatia, Austria, Iceland, Belgium and Italy, Liberal parties have been in office in more than half of the cabinets that have ever existed. The reference to Liberal parties as 'small' or 'minor' parties is therefore, for many Liberal parties, unfitting considering their frequent government participation and the political influence that this brings.

This relative success in securing formal representation in government can

Table 16.1: Liberal parties in government in 27 European countries, 1945-2015

	In government %	Share of PMs %	Average seat share %	Average seat share when in office %	Share of median legislator %	Median legislator or adjacent %
Austria	6.1	0.0	5.7	6.6	42.4	57.6
Belgium	56.2	10.4	9.5	11.6	0.0	18.7
Bulgaria	23.1	7.7	15.4	22.0	53.8	69.2
Croatia	66.7	0.0	3.9	4.3	0.0	55.6
Czech Republic	12.5	0.0	10.5	13.7	0.0	12.5
Denmark	69.2	25.6	13.1	13.9	59.0	74.4
Estonia	73.3	46.7	23.6	24.6	13.3	66.7
Finland	79.6	14.8	5.0	7.2	16.7	51.8
France	38.1	12.7	12.8	12.3	15.9	49.2
Germany	68.0	0;0	9.6	10.1	0.0	60.0
Greece	0.0	0.0	0.0	–	0.0	0.0
Hungary	36.4	0.0	10.9	8.4	0.0	45.4
Iceland	56.2	28.1	24.4	24.5	96.9	100.0
Ireland	72.0	72.0	35.5	37.7	96.0	100.0
Italy	52.3	3.1	2.6	2.1	1.5	75.4
Latvia	8.7	4.3	10.0	10.0	17.4	17.4
Lithuania	33.3	0.0	13.8	15.7	22.2	22.2
Luxembourg	42.9	9.5	18.1	21.1	0.0	100.0
Netherlands	72.7	9.1	11.6	14.2	3.0	39.4
Norway	21.9	0.0	6.5	8.4	3.1	6.2
Poland	19.0	14.3	11.1	9.3	9.5	9.5
Portugal	52.0	44.0	36.7	40.3	32.0	96.0
Romania	40.9	13.6	15.5	14.7	0	0.0
Slovenia	81.2	56.2	21.8	22.9	43.7	81.2
Spain	0.0	0.0	3.6	–	0.0	30.8
Sweden	22.6	3.2	19.3	9.3	12.5	38.7
Switzerland	100.0	0.0	100.0	22.5	10.8	26.3
United Kingdom	4.0	0.0	4.0	8.8	3.0	48.0

Note: The total number of cabinets is 771 and 666 of these were minority situations (i.e. no single party has the majority of seats in parliament). A full list of the Liberal parties included in the analysis is in the appendix. Source: Döring and Manow (2016).



Figure 16.2: Liberal parties in governments

also be seen in the share of ministerial portfolios held by Liberal parties in the different countries in our data. Data on this is presented in Figure 16.2. In some countries, Liberal parties have been among the most successful parties at securing ministerial positions. Ireland is a prominent example, but also in Portugal, Slovenia and the Czech Republic have Liberal parties held more than 1/3 of all ministerial positions. Even in a country like Germany where the CDU and SPD have dominated the party system since the Second World War, almost 1/5 of all ministers have belonged to the Liberal FDP. At the other end of the spectrum, we have countries such as Greece and Spain where Liberal parties have never held any ministerial positions or a very low share such as in Austria, France, or the UK.

What can then explain Liberal parties' successes in this regard in many European countries? In other words, why do they play such an important role in the formation of governments in some countries?

As mentioned above their role as *formateurs* is certainly an important factor. But probably even more importantly, Liberal parties often have a favourable ideological position in the party system. Thus, party ideology is another factor that needs to be taken into consideration. According to the median legislator or median party theorem, coalition formation is assumed to take place in a one-dimensional political space, and the median legislator should have a high likelihood of becoming a member of a cabinet (De Swaan and Rapoport, 1973, Laver and Schofield, 1990: 110-113). This is also the case for parties that are ideologically adjacent or proximate to the median legislator, which is often the case with Liberal parties. Given that parties have policies that they want to implement, they will try to find similar ideological partners. Parties that are

positioned close to the median party would be more likely to become government members. As governments are typically formed by and of political parties (but less so in Semi-presidential regimes), it involves bargaining between political parties with varying policy priorities and goals.

Nonetheless, depending on the particular party in question, they are more or less inclined to accept ideological compromises. Whereas fringe left- and right-wing parties are less willing to make policy concessions, centrist and moderate parties can make less costly ideological compromises in order to be included in a coalition. This happens not least because ideological compromises are easier to tolerate the closer a party is to the likely outcome of a jointly agreed policy position. In a coalition government, a policy compromise is likely to be close to the preferred position of the median legislative party. As seen in Table 16.1, the fact that Liberal parties often hold the median legislator themselves or are ideologically close to the median legislator probably helps explain why Liberal parties have a disproportionate success in entering governments despite their relatively small share of the parliamentary seats.

When cabinets are formed, Liberal parties are also rather successful in becoming the head of governments. About 13 per cent of all cabinets considered in this study were controlled by Liberal Prime Ministers (PMs). But being the largest party only accounts for 57 of the 95 cases. Other factors are also likely to play a role, such as being the median-party, or having a Liberal head of state that can nominate the PM from within his or her own party, or is free to appoint the *formateur* (Glasgow et al., 2011). This goes beyond what we can investigate in this chapter. The centrality of Liberal parties is certainly important in this respect, but getting the opportunity to form a single-party government is a guarantee.

Thus, a related question concerns what type of governments Liberal parties tend to participate in. And in particular, when they are able to form government without including any other parliamentary parties. When in cabinet, as indicated above, Liberal parties generally participate in coalition cabinets. However, Ireland and Denmark stand out in this respect, as Fianna Fáil ruled alone in half of the cabinets they participated in and Venstre in about one of five cabinets. To illustrate this, Table 16.2 shows all single-party Liberal governments and their seat share in parliament.

In Table 16.2 the three Danish, Portuguese and Swedish parties stand out as having quite low parliamentary support, but still being able to form a government without including any other parties. These governments have two features in common. Firstly, in none of these countries must an incoming cabinet (or Prime Minister) win a parliamentary majority vote to assume power (i.e. 'positive parliamentarism'), making the formation of minority cabinets more likely (Bergman, 1993, Bergman, 1995). In Sweden and Portugal, a new cabinet does not have to win such a parliamentary majority vote, but simply has to pass a negative vote in the parliament (i.e. not having an absolute majority voting against it). Danish governments, on the other hand, can be formed without any vote at all as the country lacks formal inauguration rules. Secondly, all these cases have in common the absence of a viable and strong potential alternative

Table 16.2: Single-party governments, 1945-2015

	Time in office	Cabinet name	Seat share	Party
Denmark	1945 Nov - 1947 Oct	Kristensen	25.5	Venstre
	1973 Dec - 1975 Jan	Hartling	12.3	Venstre
	2015 Jun -	Rasmussen L II	19.0	Venstre
Estonia	1996 Dec - 1997 Feb	Vahi III	40.6	Eesti Koonderakond
	1997 Mar - 1999 Mar	Siimann	40.6	Eesti Koonderakond
Ireland	1951 - 1989 (11 of 17 cabinets)	Valera VIII-IX Lemass I-III Lynch I-III Haughey I-III	46.9-56.8	Fianna Fáil
Portugal	1978 Nov - 1979 Jun	Mota Pinto (caretaker cabinet)	27.8	Partido Social Democrata
	1985 Nov - 1995 Oct	Silva I, II and III	35.2-59.2	Partido Social Democrata
Spain	1977 Jul - 1982 Oct	Suarez I, II and Calvo-Sotelo	47.4-48	Unión de Centro Democrático
Sweden	1978 Oct - 1979 Sep	Ullsten	11.2	Folkpartiet

Source: Andersson, Bergman, and Ersson (2014) with own updates.

government to the ones that were formed, mainly due to divisions between otherwise ideologically close parliamentary parties (and potential coalition partners).

A good example of this is the Swedish single-party minority cabinet led by the Liberal Party leader Ullsten. The Ullsten cabinet was one of Europe's weakest, and Sweden's weakest government in history, with a parliamentary support of only about 11 per cent. The government came to power in October 1978, just over two years after the parliamentary elections in 1976. It succeeded the previous right-wing coalition government between the Centre Party, the Liberal Party and the Conservatives that resigned because of disagreement on further expansions of nuclear plants in Sweden (Petersson, 1979). When the Prime Minister Fälldin from the Centre Party handed over his resignation, this decision was also supported by the Conservative Party leader, as the latter expected a two-party government including the Conservatives and the Liberal Party to take over. However, Ullsten chose to present a single-party Liberal government, not least because the party leadership felt that they had more in common with the Social Democrats than the Conservatives. The Liberal Party had held discussions with the Conservatives to form government, but has also held parallel discussions with the Social Democrats to form a single-party government themselves. Also, the parliamentary seat share balance gave the Liberal government the choice to achieve a parliamentary majority with both the Social Democrats and, alternatively, with the Conservatives and the Centre Party. At the vote of investiture, the Social Democrats laid down their votes making a single-party Liberal government possible (Bergstrand, 2010, Petersson, 1979).

Turning to the question of the partners with whom Liberal parties generally form government, Figure 16.3 shows the distribution of coalition partners based on party family.

The figure shows that Liberal parties are usually included in centre-left or centre-right coalitions. The most frequent coalition partners are Christian democratic/Conservative parties, followed by Social Democratic and Agrarian parties. There is a slight tendency for Liberal parties to form or be invited in right-wing governments over more left-wing governments, but the difference is not very pronounced. As party ideology matters for whom parties choose to invite for negotiations or to form governments with, it should come as no surprise that Liberal parties, which are ideologically positioned near the centre or the centre-right, cooperate in governments with parties with similar positions. Liberal parties that focus more on social liberalism should see cooperation with Social Democratic parties as more viable, whereas Liberal parties that put a greater emphasis on economic liberalism should prefer right-wing coalition partners.

Portfolio allocation and Liberal parties

As we saw in Figure 16.2, Liberal parties have held a sizeable chunk of ministerial positions in most countries, even though the precise number differs quite significantly between the countries in our data. Portfolio allocation is one of



Figure 16.3: Liberal parties coalition partners (by party families)

those rare cases in political science where a single mechanism, namely the principle of proportionality, can explain a lot of what is going on. Already in the 1970s, (Browne and Franklin, 1973) demonstrated that government parties tend to receive a share of portfolios that is roughly proportional to the share of seats they control in parliament. That is, if a particular coalition member has control over 15% of the government's seats in parliament, it also tends to get around 15% of the available portfolios (Bäck et al., 2009).

However, not all ministerial portfolios are of equal importance. A few ministries tend to be highly desired by most parties (such as Finance or Foreign Affairs), whereas others tend to be more important to particular parties depending on issues that they emphasise and prioritise. For example, the portfolio of Agriculture has traditionally been more important to Agrarian parties, as has the portfolio of Labour been to Social Democratic parties. When it comes to Liberal parties and portfolio allocation, the question is then first if their central ideological position in the party system (and the increased bargaining power that comes with that position) gives them access to more highly desired portfolios. And second, when given the choice, which portfolios do Liberal parties tend to prioritize?

Expectations for portfolio allocation

revious research has suggested that Liberal parties have actually found it difficult to use their central ideological position or increased bargaining power to

get qualitatively more important ministries. (Warwick and Druckman, 2006) looked at whether the resources that a party brings to the coalition are not only its legislative size, but also its bargaining power as measured by the Shapley-Shubik (Shapley and Shubik, 1954) index or the Banzhaf index (Banzhaf III, 1964). Warwick and Druckman (2006) first relied on country experts to assign qualitative values to the different portfolios in order to have a measure of which ministries were most highly valued within each country. They then tested whether parties with higher bargaining power were more likely to obtain a share of the most valuable portfolios.

As it turns out, refining the analysis in this way to account for other aspects of party bargaining power than their share of parliamentary seats does not improve our ability to predict portfolio allocation. The general rule of a proportional relationship between legislative seats and portfolios therefore seems to apply to Liberal parties as well. The central ideological position of Liberal parties thus makes them more likely to end up in government, but it does not help them obtain quantitatively more or qualitatively better posts than the other parties in the government. The main reason why Liberal parties get more ministerial posts than other parties of equal size are that they are more likely to end up in government in the first place. Clearly, parties that get a seat at the table also obtain more portfolios than those that do not. However, once in government, Liberal parties do not get a greater number of portfolios than what the law of proportionality would suggest.

Turning our attention to the preferences of Liberal parties in the bargaining over ministerial portfolios - which portfolios are they likely to be the most interested in obtaining? Kirchner (1988) argued that they are mostly interested in portfolios related to the defence of individual rights (such as Justice or Home affairs) or related to economic management, such as Finance or Trade (also see Budge and Keman, 1990), as these portfolios are in line with the classic liberal ideological profile. Issues related to Law and Order, as well as market-liberal and centre-right economic policies, are important aspects of the policy platforms of most European Liberal parties. It thus makes sense that they would want to work actively on these questions while in power. Additionally, many Liberal parties focus on international cooperation (including EU integration and migration) and socio-cultural issues connected to individual and social rights, such as, for example, marriage equality and abortion. As Liberal parties have increasingly emphasised these issues to distinguish themselves from the crowded centre-right spectrum of the left-right continuum, it seems likely that they have also been interested in securing these portfolios.

Dividing the pie - which ministerial portfolios do Liberal parties get?

In order to examine whether Liberal parties actually obtain the portfolios that match their ideological profile, we use a dataset on ministerial positions in Europe that covers 26 countries between 1945 and 2015. For the governments that were in office up until 1998 we use the dataset created by Woldendorp et al



Figure 16.4: Portfolios of liberal parties in Europe

Note: Overview of the portfolios that Liberal parties most frequently hold. The percentage is the share of times that portfolio has been held out of all portfolios held by Liberal parties. Thus, 6.1% of all Liberal ministers have been Justice ministers.

(2000) and for the years 1999 to 2012 we use the data collected by Seki and Williams (2014). For the years 2012-2015 we have done an in-house manual update of the data. In total, the updated dataset contains information on more than 16,000 ministerial positions, out of which Liberal parties held about 1900.

Figure 16.4 shows the distribution of portfolios among the total of 1944 ministerial positions held by Liberal parties. The Figure shows the 17 most popular portfolios and these accounts for approximately 65% of all positions held by liberal parties. The other 35% (not reported here) are made up of less frequently held positions that mainly tend to be smaller or country specific portfolios that lack clear cross-country equivalents. In Figure 16.4 we can see that the most popular positions tend to be in line with what we could expect based on Liberal parties' ideological priorities. The most common portfolio has been Justice, which was held by Liberal politicians on 119 occasions, or 6.1% of all the portfolios held by Liberal parties. Given the strong liberal commitment to the rule of law and due process, and the fact that the Justice portfolio is usually not the most sought after, this is not a surprising finding.

The second and third most common ministerial positions are Finance and Foreign Affairs. As Liberal parties are generally interested in economic management and are committed to international issues and global cooperation, it is not surprising that these positions are also actively bargained for in the govern-

ment formation process. What is more surprising is that Liberal parties have so frequently been able to obtain two positions with such high saliency despite the fact that they tend to be one of the smaller coalition partners. This is particularly interesting as it goes against Warwick Druckman (2006)'s finding that even qualitatively more important portfolios tend to be distributed according to the law of proportionality. This suggests that Liberal parties place particular weight on these two posts and might therefore be willing to accept other, far less salient portfolios as a trade-off to ensure that they do not get a qualitatively disproportionate share overall.

Moreover, this finding cannot be explained by country differences. The position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, for example, was monopolized by a Liberal party (FDP) in Germany, where it held the position in every government for 29 consecutive years between 1969 and 1998. However, Liberal parties have been successful in gaining the portfolio in almost every country in our dataset including Eastern Europe. In Slovenia, for example, the Liberal LDS has held the position in three governments since 1996. The fact that two high-saliency positions have been repeatedly secured by Liberal parties in many different countries suggests that they tend to put significant weight on them in coalition negotiations.

Further down the list in Figure 16.4 we also find portfolios that are less associated with the classic liberal profile. Defence, for example, the fourth most common portfolio is usually of greater importance to Conservative or Nationalist parties. Liberal parties have nonetheless managed to secure that position 100 times (or 5.1% of all portfolios held Liberal parties). However, in general, if we look at the 17 most common portfolios depicted in Figure 16.4, most of them are in line with what we would expect on ideological grounds: Home Affairs, Industry and Trade, or Economic Affairs. What stands out is that a number of portfolios less associated with the liberal ideology, such as Public works, Social Affairs, or Health, also score relatively high. These findings taken together seem to suggest that Liberal parties often get some of their preferred portfolios (even high-saliency ones such as Finance and Foreign Affairs), but generally being smaller coalition partners, they frequently also accept positions that are less closely aligned with their core ideological profile.

Conclusion

One of the characteristics of many Liberal parties in Europe is the significant difference between their extensive government participation and their average electoral and parliamentary strength. Nonetheless, as discussed in this chapter, Liberal parties occupy a special position in many party systems in Europe. In particular, their central ideological position and their pragmatic relationship with parties on both sides of the political spectrum have ensured that they can play a significant role in the formal democratic processes despite their often modest electoral size. However, although Liberal parties have been unusually successful at getting into government in many countries, this does not imply that

once in government, they necessarily get more or more important ministerial portfolios than their electoral size would allow (Warwick Druckman 2006). They do, however, have particular preferences about which portfolios they want to take responsible for. In particular, Justice, Finance, and Foreign Affairs seem to be highly valued.

There are, however, considerable between-country differences in Liberal parties' abilities to uphold the pivotal role in government formation. Even in some countries where government incumbency has been the rule rather than the exception, Liberal parties are starting to struggle. Most notably, FPD in Germany, which has been in the vast majority of German governments since World War II, failed to pass the parliamentary threshold in 2013 and faces an uncertain position as to its future. Similarly, the Swedish Folkpartiet received only 5.4% in the latest election in 2014, its second worst result since the party was founded in 1934. On the other hand, Liberal parties seem to be making strides in Eastern Europe and have been successful in gaining both parliamentary seats and office in all but a few of the volatile democratic party systems in the region.

However, it is still reasonable to suggest that Liberal parties are likely to continue to have an above average success rate at getting into government. As long as the parties do not deviate too much from the centre of the ideological landscape, their pivotal role in forming coalitions is likely to continue to earn them a seat in government, provided of course that they manage to secure parliamentary representation.

In that regard, a complicating factor is the increasing importance of identity politics and the second dimension in politics (Hooghe et al., 2002), the so-called Green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) - traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (TAN) dimension, which could present an obstacle for Liberal parties in the future. While they are at present and in most systems, located at the centre on left-right issues, they do not necessarily enjoy the same centrality on issues related to 'new politics' or cultural issues. The growing importance of issues associated with this dimension could therefore mean that Liberal parties need to adapt and change to retain their pivotal role in government formation processes and their place in future governments.

Appendix

In the chapter, we examine a rather long time-period, from 1945 until 2015. Thus, we need to consider that some parties might have developed into Liberal parties over time, whereas others experienced such fundamental ideological changes that they can no longer be considered as such. To account for temporal changes in parties' ideological profiles in this chapter, we have limited the time period for which we include some of the parties and have also included some additional parties not covered in the other chapters. More specifically, we included the Austrian FPÖ, but only for a shorter time-period. FPÖ with its roots in national liberalism, long considered as the party of old Nazis, was founded in 1956. Over time it gradually developed to become what, at least on the surface, could be classified as a Liberal party. In 1979 it joined the Liberal International and in 1983 the party participated in its first government. Thus, we include FPÖ between 1983 until 1986 before the party started the reverse ideological turn towards right-wing populism under the party leader Jörg Haider, even though the party was a member in Liberal International until 1993 (Luther, 1998). In addition, the former Agrarian Finish Centre party (KESK) and Swedish Centre Party (C) was coded Liberal from the year 1992 to 1995, respectively. That is, when they become affiliated with or members of the ELDR. Finally, for France we include the parties, in the federation of parties of UDF (Frears, 1988), that was members of ELDR (and its predecessors) until they left the organization in 1994. Table 16.3 lists all parties that we examine in the chapter.

Table 16.3: Appendix. Parties included in the comparative analysis

	Political parties included
Austria	FPÖ 1979-1986; NEOS; LIF
Belgium	PVV/PLP with its predecessors and successors (i.e. PL, LP-PL, PRL, PVV, VLD)
Bulgaria	NDSV, DPS
Croatia	HNS, HSLS, IDS-DD, LS
Czech Republic	A02011, LIDEM/VIZE 2014, US-DEU
Denmark	RV, V, I
Estonia	EK, ER
Finland	KESK from 1992, Ålandic Centre, SFP, L-LKP
France	Most of UDF until 1994.
Germany	FDP
Greece	Drassi
Hungary	SZDSZ, MLP
Iceland	FSF, BF
Ireland	FF, PD
Italy	PRI,PLI, IdV, ApI, PR-R
Latvia	LPP/LC, LA
Lithuania	DP, LiCS, LLS, LRLS
Luxembourg	DP
Netherlands	VVD, D66
Norway	V
Poland	DP, RP, KLD, UD, UW
Portugal	PLD, PDR, PSD, MPT
Romania	PNL
Slovenia	LDS, ZaAB, SMC, DL
Spain	CDC,C's, UPyD, CDS
Sweden	C after 1994, FP
Switzerland	FDP, LPS, LdU-ADI
United Kingdom	LibDem

Source:Andersson, Bergman, and Ersson (2014); Döring and Manow (2016).

Note: The parties in italics have "disappeared" or lost their relevance. They are included in longitudinal analysis, but are not relevant anymore today.

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